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Abstract
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.”2
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.”2 A series of Florida intermediate appellate court cases
followed during this survey year, applying the Florida holdings as to Miller.3
The Florida appellate courts continued to rule on a number of issues involving
dependency and termination of parental rights (“TPR”), focusing in large part
on rudimentary violations of procedural due process by the trial courts.4 In the

*
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of
Law. This Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2014 through June 30,
2015. The author thanks research assistants Michael Costello, Andree Quaresima, and Samantha
Scheff and Research and References Services Librarian, Rob Beharriell, for their assistance in
writing this Survey.
1.
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2.
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 960 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
3.
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 958; Horsley, 160 So. 3d
at 394, 397.
4.
See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 566, 569–70
(Fla. 1991); Dep’t of Children & Families v. T.S., 154 So. 3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
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delinquency area, restitution is a common dispositional alternative.5 There, the
appellate courts have on a number of occasions been obligated to reverse trial
court decisions for improperly applying the restitution statute.6
Finally, and most importantly, the decades long shortcomings in the
Florida dependency system—based in significant part on the lack of
representation of children by lawyers, and the failure of Florida’s Guardian ad
Litem (“GAL”) Program to both adequately and properly carry out its statutory
role despite massive funding—have yet again remained a very serious problem
during this survey year.7
II.

DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

In dependency proceedings, there must be competent and substantial
evidence to form a basis for a finding of dependency.8 Thus, a mother’s
homelessness and unemployment, standing alone, are insufficient to support a
finding of prospective harm or neglect in a situation where the mother has not
previously rejected services offered under Florida law, according to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in E.R. v. Department of Children & Families.9
In N.J. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of
A.W.J.),10 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a finding of dependency
premised upon a head injury to a child.11 The only individual who testified at
the adjudicatory hearing that the child’s head injury was the result of abuse was
a medical doctor.12 However, first, the doctor was not asked whether she could
provide her opinion within a reasonable degree of medical probability and,
second, the doctor’s opinion of abuse was not substantiated by record evidence
but was simply a subjective opinion, which was thus not legally sufficient to
support the trial court’s adjudication of dependency.13
5.
See L.W. v. State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v.
State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
6.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.437(2) (2014); L.W., 163 So. 3d at 601; A.D., 152 So.
3d at 799; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
7.
See Michael J. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 39 NOVA L. REV. 37, 62–
63 (2014) [hereinafter Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale & Louis M.
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 305, 310, 329–31 (2011)
[hereinafter Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children]; infra Section V.B.
8.
J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 3d 151, 151–52 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
9.
143 So. 3d 1131, 1133, 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). See generally
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
10.
143 So. 3d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
11.
Id. at 1110–11.
12.
Id. at 1111.
13.
Id. at 1111–12.
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In Department of Children & Families v. T.S.,14 the intermediate
appellate court reversed on a more fundamental ground.15 The Department and
the child appealed the dismissal of a petition for dependency and arraignment,
arguing that the trial court had committed a fundamental error violating a
child’s due process rights by dismissing the petition without notice or an
opportunity to be heard.16 Recognizing the basic due process violation
involving notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court reversed.17
Case plans are an important part of dependency proceedings resulting,
as they do, from the implementation of the federal Child Abuse Protection and
Treatment Act, commonly known as CAPTA.18 In M.P. v. Department of
Children & Families,19 the appellate court noted that generic case plans that do
not relate to the individual needs and circumstances of the particular family are
in violation of section 39.603 of the Florida Statutes.20 In the case at bar, there
being no evidence of the father’s use of drugs, a case plan that ordered the
father to submit to random drug screenings as part of the case plan constituted
reversible error.21 A similar result occurred in M.B.W. v. Department of
Children & Families (In re Interest of M.W.).22 In that dependency case, the
Department conceded error in part as tasks were required beyond a parenting
class, which had no relationship to the dependency as to the father.23
The issue of nexus—the tie between a parent’s problem and risk of
danger to the children—has perplexed the Florida dependency courts for almost
twenty-five years since the Supreme Court of Florida decided Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services24 in 1991.25 In E.H. v.
Department of Children & Families,26 the appellate court affirmed the trial court
finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
imminent abuse to a child in a dependency case.27 In E.H., there were incidents
of domestic violence, unemployment with an eviction from the home, and a
mother with a mental health issue that had gone untreated, which was
responsible for her previous child being removed from her care after she heard
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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154 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
42 U.S.C. § 622 (2012).
159 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 343–44; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.603(1)(f) (2014).
M.P., 159 So. 3d at 344.
163 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 1229.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
Id. at 570–71; Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 60–61.
147 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 620–21.
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voices encouraging her to shake that child.28 In E.H., the appellate court
established that the mother’s failure to recognize her mood disorder and her lack
of participation in services, along with multiple domestic violence incidents
between the mother and the father where the mother continued to engage in the
relationship with the father despite the parent-involved nature of their
relationship, constituted evidence of a substantial risk of imminent abuse to the
child.29
An important technical procedural issue was before the First District
Court of Appeal in W.W. v. Guardian ad Litem Program.30 The issue was
whether an order entered on a post-dependency motion seeking relief fully
resolving the issues that were raised in the motion is reviewed by appeal rather
than writ.31 Applying a recent amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4) of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure,32 the appellate court concluded that orders
entered on post-dependency motions seeking relief that fully resolve the issues
raised in the motion are to be viewed as final orders under the appellate rule.33
Cases involving immigrant children are becoming more commonplace
in the Florida dependency courts as a result of the influx of such children
nationally.34 In In re Y.V.,35 a private petition for dependency was filed on
behalf of a minor “living in Florida after illegally emigrating alone from
Honduras.”36 The petition was dismissed by the trial court because the harm
relating to the dependency took place outside of Florida, and “the court viewed
the petition as an attempt to circumvent federal immigration law[].”37 The
appellate court reversed, finding that there was jurisdiction and that Florida

28.
Id. at 617.
29.
Id. at 620–21; see also W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d
1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that substantial evidence of harm to one child
alone was not sufficient evidence to find substantial risk of imminent abuse to another child);
E.M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that a substantial risk of harm can be met without past acts of harm where a mental
illness is the type that would impact the parent’s “judgment and ability to perform basic daily
caretaking tasks”).
30.
159 So. 3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
31.
Id.
32.
In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 2014 WL
5714099, at *7–8 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2014) (specifying the amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4)).
33.
Id.; W.W., 159 So. 3d at 1000–01.
34.
See, e.g., WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN
FLORIDA: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 5, 7 (2007),
http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenilemanual-2007.pdf.
35.
160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
36.
Id. at 577.
37.
Id.
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dependency law applies.38 Although the appellate court reversed, it did note
that “the trial court [was] not alone in its misgivings about the use of the
dependency [proceedings] as a conduit to achiev[e] a favorable immigration
status.”39 The appellate court also pointed to two provisions in chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes that applied to this child: abandonment, abuse or neglect by the
parent and having no parent capable of providing supervision and care.40 The
appellate court then noted that the only reason the child was not in imminent
risk of injury was because there is a responsible adult caring for the child on a
voluntary basis.41
Domestic violence can be the source of dependency court jurisdiction.42
Issues of domestic violence can also arise in the context of petitions to protect
and against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 of the Florida
Statutes.43 In Hair v. Hair,44 the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial
court’s decision with instructions to vacate a final judgment of injunction for
protection.45 The appellate court found that the petitioner did not possess
“sufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic violence or was in
imminent danger [to become] a victim” as provided in the Florida Statutes.46
Specifically, it found that the daughter did not wish to see or interact with her
mother and that was not a basis for the issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order.47
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Under Florida law, the petitioner must prove: first, that there are
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights; second, that termination is
in the “manifest best interest of the child;” and third, that termination is the least
restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm.48 In B.K. v.
Department of Children & Families,49 the appellate court addressed the
application of the three standards in a case in which the father was
38.
Id. at 581.
39.
Id. at 579, 581.
40.
In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 578; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(a), (e) (2014).
41.
In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 579.
42.
See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REV.
357, 357 (2009).
43.
FLA. STAT. § 741.30.
44.
159 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
45.
Id. at 986.
46.
Id. at 985; see also FLA. STAT. § 741.30.
47.
Hair, 159 So. 3d at 985.
48.
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.806, .810; Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577
So. 2d 565, 570–71 (Fla. 1991).
49.
166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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incarcerated.50 Under Florida law, the substantive standard regarding
incarceration is that the incarceration be for a significant portion of the child’s
life.51 In B.K., the father was scheduled for release after nearly eight and a half
years of the child’s life.52 Here, the father would be “incarcerated for nearly
fifty percent of [the child’s] minority” at the point the father is to be released
from prison.53 The child had also been in foster care for a period of time, and
“at the time of trial, the child was nearly six years old.”54 On the question of
manifest best interest, the trial court found no bond with the child, no relative
placement and that the child did not know who her father was.55 Finally, the
trial court found and the appellate court agreed based upon clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child.56 Citing that
termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the appellate
court noted that merely sending letters and cards to a child is not enough
because “then it would be difficult indeed to terminate the rights of any parent
incarcerated for a lengthy period of time, regardless of the child’s lack of a real
relationship with her parent. This [would] leave the child without any
[parenting] at all, which would not be in her best interest.”57 The appellate court
thus affirmed.58
On the other hand, in D.S. v. Department of Children & Families,59 the
court reversed a finding of termination of parental rights arising out of a father’s
incarceration.60 In D.S., “[i]n percentage terms, the father’s incarceration
amount[ed] to approximately 27[%] to 33[%] of the children’s minorit[y].”61 In
doing so, the appellate court cited B.C. v. Florida Department of Children &
Families,62 in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that the percentages in
D.S. would “not constitute a substantial portion of the children’s minorit[y].”63
While terminating the parental rights of the father to one of the three children,
50.
Id. at 873.
51.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)(1).
52.
B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873.
53.
Id. at 874.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 872.
56.
Id. at 872–73. “[T]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence that
reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. . . . [and
that] termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious
harm.” Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
57.
B.K., 166 So. 3d at 877.
58.
Id.
59.
164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
60.
Id. at 36.
61.
Id. at 34.
62.
887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004).
63.
Id. at 1054–55; D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34.
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the court did not find termination as to the other two.64 Those children were in a
stable home, not in the custody of the Department, and the father maintained a
close relationship, given the father’s incarceration, with the children.65
Specifically, they knew who their father was and had “regular interaction with
him, [which included] regular phone calls, letters, and visits.”66 At the time of
his release, the children would be eleven and six.67 Because they were with
relatives and still had contact with their father, and there being no evidence of
harm to the children, termination was not the least restrictive means to prevent
harm, and the appellate court reversed.68
Whether termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of
protecting the child from harm, the third question before the trial court in any
termination of parental rights case, was on appeal in two separate cases during
this reporting cycle.69 In A.H. v. Department of Children & Families,70 a parent
appealed termination of her parental rights as to her son on the ground that
termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from
harm.71 The State conceded error on this point.72 The appellate court reviewed
the record in which the trial court created a permanent guardianship for the
child.73 However, “there [was] no evidence that the mother’s irregular
contact[s]” caused harm to the child, although there was evidence “that the child
had a strong bond with the permanent guardian and was doing . . . well” there,
the child “also enjoyed his visits with [his] mother and his siblings and [wanted]
to maintain a relationship with them.”74 Under those circumstances, termination
of parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from
harm.75 Interestingly, the GAL program apparently did not concede error.76
The GAL program, although the record does not reflect whether the individual
was qualified as an expert, testified that the parents were not “‘bonded to [the
child] at all. . . . Emotionally and mentally it would be devastating to take him

64.
D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34–36.
65.
Id. at 35.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 36.
69.
See C.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014).
70.
144 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
71.
Id. at 664.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 664, 666.
74.
Id. at 666.
75.
A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666.
76.
Id. at 665.
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out of his home [with the permanent guardian].’”77 On the basis of this opinion,
“[t]he GAL recommended termination of parental rights [based on] the . . . best
interests of the child so [that] he could receive permanency through adoption.”78
By reversing, the appellate court rejected this lay opinion.79 In fact, contrary to
what occurred in this case, the GAL guidelines state that guardians ad litem
shall not offer expert opinions.80
In C.D. v. Florida Department of Children & Families,81 the appellate
court reversed in part on the basis of the trial court’s misinterpretation of A.H.82
The appellate court held that first, the trial court ruling was in error because it
was at odds with its own factual finding that the children did have a bond with
their parents, and second, the trial court misconstrued age, which the “court held
that TPR [could be] the least restrictive means of protecting a child from harm
despite the fact that there was little or no bond between the child and [the
parent].”83
Here, again, the appellate court rejected the opinion of the GAL who
argued that TPR was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the
children.84 The appellate court held that the GAL’s opinion on appeal was
“diametrically opposed to the position it took below in which it argued that the
children would not be harmed by TPR because their aunt would allow them to
have contact with the [m]other.”85
The interplay of rights of putative fathers and termination of parental
rights based upon abandonment was before the Fourth District in A.S. v.
Department of Children & Families.86 The father, whose paternity was
established approximately a year after the child was born, appealed from a
termination of parental rights adjudication.87 The mother had played a
nonexistent role in the child’s life and termination had been entered against
her.88 The father did not know that he was the parent of the child until a

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
See id. at 666.
See A.H., 144 So. 3d at 664–65; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
FLORIDA
GUARDIAN
AD
LITEM
PROGRAM
STANDARDS
9
(2015),
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Standards_Final_2015.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS].
81.
164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
82.
Id. at 43–44; see also A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666.
83.
C.D., 164 So. 3d at 43–44.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 44.
86.
162 So. 3d 335, 336–37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
87.
Id. at 337.
88.
Id. at 336.
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paternity test was taken a year after the child was born.89 Even then, he did not
learn that he was the father for another approximately four months.90 Once it
was determined that he was the father, he began taking “steps to begin forming
a relationship with [the child].”91 Despite this, the trial court entered an order
terminating the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment.92 The
appellate court recognized that the definition of parent “does not include . . . an
alleged or prospective parent unless the parental status falls within the terms of
[section] 39.503(1) or [section] 63.062(1).”93 Because the Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”) failed to utilize the proper provisions of chapter
39 of the Florida Statutes to locate the father and because the court could only
consider whether the father abandoned the child once the father’s paternity was
established, the trial court erroneously relied upon the failure to take affirmative
steps to establish paternity prior to that time.94 The appellate court held that the
trial court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment.95 And finally, the appellate court held that the father “was never
offered a case plan despite [the fact that there was] no indication in the record
that he was unable to comply with [it].”96 On these bases, the appellate court
reversed.97
Periodically, cases appear concerning the proper procedures for appeals
in child welfare cases.98 R.W. v. Department of Children & Families99 involved
the question of whether “the trial court erred in denying [a] post-judgment
motion to set aside the surrender” of parental rights for lack of jurisdiction.100
In R.W., an expedited petition was filed by DCF to terminate the mother’s
parental rights to her child where the mother had executed a sworn consent to
surrender those rights.101 However, after receiving the order, the mother filed a
motion claiming “that the judgment was inconsistent with the trial court’s oral
ruling on the mother’s visitation rights pending adoption of the child. The trial
court denied the motion, and the mother thereafter timely filed a notice of
89.
Id. at 337.
90.
Id.
91.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 337.
92.
Id. at 337–38; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), 39.503(1), 63.062(1) (2014).
93.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 338 (first alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
39.01(49)); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.503(1), 63.062(1).
94.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803(8); A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339.
95.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339.
96.
Id. at 340.
97.
Id.
98.
See, e.g., R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 15, 17–18 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
99.
164 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
100.
Id. at 16.
101.
Id.
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appeal.”102 However, “[p]rior to filing her initial brief, the mother filed a
motion asking [the appellate] court to ‘relinquish partial jurisdiction [so that] the
trial court’” could consider the mother’s motion for reconsideration.103 The
appellate court viewed the motion as one for relief from judgment and granted
the motion, relinquishing jurisdiction.104 After an evidentiary hearing, “the trial
court . . . entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.”105 The
mother did not file a notice of appeal challenging that order but instead filed a
status report to the appellate court.106 The appellate court entered the filing and
instructed the mother to have her initial brief filed.107 Because “the mother did
not file a notice of appeal seeking review of the order denying her motion for
reconsideration,” the court on appeal refused to interpret the status report as a
notice of appeal.108 Having “relinquished jurisdiction [for] the trial court to rule
on the motion for reconsideration” in the absence of an appeal from the order on
the motion for relief in judgment, the appellate court had no preserved issue
before it and thus, affirmed the final judgment terminating the mother’s parental
rights.109
IV.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

On March 19, 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases
involving application of the Supreme Court of the United States’ opinions in
Graham v. Florida110 and Miller.111 In Graham, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not allow a juvenile
defendant to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for non-homicide
crimes.112 In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that juveniles
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing based upon
their diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform, and it held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the courts from sentencing juveniles to life in prison
without the possibility of parole in capital cases.113
102.
Id. at 17.
103.
Id.
104.
R.W., 164 So. 3d at 17–18.
105.
Id. at 17.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See id. at 18.
109.
R.W., 164 So. 3d at 18.
110.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
111.
See id. at 82; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012); Falcon
v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 959–60, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394,
405–06, 409 (Fla. 2015).
112.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 82; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
113.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Two Supreme Court of Florida cases followed the Supreme Court of the
United States’ rulings.114 In Falcon v. State,115 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that Miller should be read retroactively.116 In Horsley v. State,117 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the remedy in terms of a sentencing option
in order to comply with Miller does not require revival of the Florida statute
regarding life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.118
The Horsley case involved post-Miller and Graham convictions of
juveniles as adults based upon the Supreme Court of the United States’
conclusion that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders.”119 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the doctrine of statutory
revival, which had been argued by the State.120 The State took the position that
the only possible sentencing options to comply with Miller were life without
parole or the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.121 The Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that the recent change in the Florida Statute was effective
on July 1, 2014, and should apply to those juvenile offenders whose sentences
were for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2014, but after Miller and
Graham.122 The Florida Statute from 2014 governed those who did the killing
and those who did not actually kill or attempt to kill.123 The Legislature then
added a detailed value process in the same statute.124
In Falcon, the Supreme Court of Florida undertook an analysis of
whether Miller should be applied retroactively to juveniles who were convicted
of capital offenses prior to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in
that case.125 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Miller should be given
retroactive effect based upon its retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State.126
The Court relied upon the principle set out in Witt, finding that Miller
114.

See Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 955, 959, 964; Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394, 397,

408–09.
115.
162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015).
116.
Id. at 956, 963–64; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
117.
160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015).
118.
Id. at 395, 409; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b)(2)(a) (2014); Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2475.
119.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 82
(2010).
120.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395.
121.
Id.; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
122.
See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394–95, 406, 408–09.
123.
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1); see also Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 406.
124.
Act effective July 1, 2014, ch. 2014-220, § 7, 2014 Fla. Laws 2869, 2876–77.
125.
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 2015); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
126.
387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956; see also Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2475.
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constitutes a “development of fundamental significance and therefore, must be
given retroactive effect.”127
The issue of retroactivity under Miller initially was to be before the
Supreme Court of the United States this term in a pair of cases, State v.
Montgomery128 and State v. Toca.129 Although the Supreme Court of the United
States granted a writ of certiorari in both cases, Montgomery was the only case
heard due to the procedural issues that resulted in the dismissal of Toca.130
Montgomery had been in prison for nearly fifty years after a guilty without
capital punishment verdict was returned by the jury.131 This verdict
automatically imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole.132
Montgomery sought collateral relief from the State of Louisiana for his
conviction, arguing that Miller should retroactively apply to his sentence
because of the automatic life sentence without parole that was attached to his
conviction.133 The trial court denied his motion and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied his writ because the court had previously held that Miller did
not retroactively apply.134 However, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Montgomery that Miller does retroactively apply because the rule
established in Miller was “a new substantive rule of constitutional law.”135 New
substantive rules “alter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes” and must apply retroactively.136 The Court found that although
the rule in Miller was substantive, an individual affected by it is afforded the
procedural opportunity to demonstrate that he or she belongs to the given
protected class.137 Given the Supreme Court holding in Montgomery, the
decision in Falcon, holding that Miller applied retroactively will be upheld.138
This Survey has repeatedly discussed restitution as one of a number of
dispositional alternatives in delinquency cases in addition to commitment,
probation, community service, revocation of driver’s license and attendance at

127.
Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931); see also Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2475.
128.
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), rev’g 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014).
129.
141 So. 3d 265 (La. 2014).
130.
Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (dismissing certiorari).
131.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–26.
132.
Id. at 726.
133.
Id. at 726–27.
134.
Id. at 727.
135.
Id. at 732–35.
136.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
353 (2004)).
137.
Id. at 735.
138.
See Montgomery, slip op. at 14; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon v. State,
162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015).
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school.139 Despite what would appear to be a statute clear on its face, this past
year the appellate courts dealt with seven separate cases involving the
restitution provision provided in section 985.437 of the Florida Statutes.140 In
J.A.B. v. State,141 the child appealed a $460 restitution award.142 “At the
restitution hearing, the victim stated that . . . it would cost between $460 and
$490 to repair the damage to [the] vehicle” while giving no basis for his
opinion.143 No document was introduced demonstrating the actual repair cost.144
Thus, as “the award was not supported by competent [and] substantial
evidence,” the appellate court reversed.145
In K.R. v. State,146 a child appealed from a $479 restitution adjudication
arising out of the theft of an automobile.147 Because the victim simply testified
that the amount “was like [$479] plus like there would be no tax,” and there was
no further evidence, the court on appeal reversed based upon the speculative
amount testified to by the victim.148
In S.M. v. State,149 the juvenile had been ordered to pay $8629 in
restitution arising out of the theft of an automobile.150 The appellate court
affirmed on the grounds that the victim of the automobile expressed an opinion
as to the value of the automobile basing the opinion on information obtained
from a website, such as the Kelley Blue Book.151 However, in so ruling, the
appellate court held that taking judicial notice of an online Kelley Blue Book
evaluation, although it did not occur in this case, would not comply with the
Florida Rules of Evidence.152 The appellate court explained that there needed to
be evidentiary demonstration that the Kelley Blue Book website had the “level

139.
FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law,
supra note 7, at 53.
140.
K.R. v. State, 155 So. 3d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015); L.W. v.
State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599–601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966, 967–
68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); J.A.B. v. State, 148 So.
3d 151, 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); M.K. v. State, 143 So. 3d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.437(1)–(2).
141.
148 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
142.
Id. at 151.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 151–52.
146.
155 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
147.
Id. at 508–09.
148.
Id.
149.
159 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
150.
Id. at 967.
151.
Id. at 967, 969.
152.
S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967, 969; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.202(12) (2014).
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of accuracy [contradicted] with that of a court-recognized appraiser” or was
“relied upon by a high percentage of car traders.”153
A case involving both the competence of a victim to testify to the value
of stolen goods and the failure of the State to demonstrate that the value of the
stolen goods reached the statutory minimum was before the Fourth District in
M.K. v. State.154 In this delinquency case, the respondent appealed the order
finding him guilty of first-degree petty theft, arguing that there was no
competent evidence of the value of the stolen necklace so that the respondent
could be charged with third-degree grand theft, which required that the property
be “valued at $300 or more [or] . . . less than $5,000.”155 Because the twelveyear-old victim could not provide competent evidence as to the value of the
stolen necklace and that the victim was not competent to testify as to the value
required, the appellate court reversed.156 Specifically, “because the necklace
was a gift, the victim was unable to testify [as] to [the] . . . purchase price or
replacement cost beyond” testifying as to what the victim was told by a parent
based upon research on the Internet.157
Two cases, C.W. v. State158 and L.W. v. State,159 dealt with the question
of whether the court could properly enter an order of restitution in a
delinquency case where the respondent was not present.160 In the C.W. case, the
court ordered $664 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month.161 However, the
respondent was not present and the court failed to find that the child had the
ability to pay.162 Because the child was not present and there was no showing
that the child had waived his presence, the court reversed.163 However, in L.W.,
where the child was ordered to pay $321.61 in $30 monthly installments based
upon a damaged window, the court found at first the child had waived his right
to attend, as the lawyer withdrew his objection based upon the child not being
present.164 However, the trial court failed to make the requisite factual findings
of the child’s or the family’s ability to make payments of $30 per month.165

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967.
143 So. 3d 428, 430–31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.014(3)(c)(1).
M.K., 143 So. 3d at 431–32.
Id. at 431.
150 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
163 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 599; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
Id.
Id.
L.W., 163 So. 3d at 599–600.
Id. at 601.
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In A.D. v. State,166 the trial court entered a restitution order regarding a
camera even though there was no reference to it “as an item stolen in the grand
theft count contained in [the] . . . petition for delinquency.”167 On that simple
basis, the court held that the trial court lacks the authority to require restitution,
as the only restitution allowable is that of which arises out of the offense
charged as reflected in the information or factual basis for the plea.168
In a delinquency case, it is not unusual for the State to be unable to
serve a respondentalleged delinquentwith a summons to appear.169 In State
v. C.W.,170 the State appealed a trial court final order entered sua sponte,
dismissing the petition in a delinquency case for failure to serve.171 The
appellate court ruled quite simply that the trial court improperly ruled on an
issue that was not before it and that it interfered with the State’s discretion to
bring charges against the child.172 However, oddly, because the State had not
preserved the argument for appeal, the appellate court dismissedalbeit,
writing to emphasize that where no motion to dismiss had been filed by the
child, the trial court was without authority to dismiss the prosecution sua
sponte.173
Discovery is an important matter in delinquency and adult criminal
cases often reaching constitutional dimensions.174 In M.H. v. State,175 a child
appealed from an order that withheld “adjudication of delinquency and
impos[ed] probation for [the] burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and [petty]
theft.”176 The claim on appeal was a discovery violation in which the State
listed the victim of the charged offenses as a Category B witness rather than a
Category A witness under Florida law.177 As a result, the trial court failed to
hold a Richardson Hearing.178 Failure to conduct a hearing under the facts of
the case constituted reversible error.179
The question of a proper search and seizure, in the context of a child
who was not in school and thus a possible truant, was before the Fourth District

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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152 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798–99.
See State v. C.W., 166 So. 3d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
166 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 950.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 773, 777 (Fla. 1971).
151 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.; see also Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 773–77.
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in J.R. v. State.180 The child was found guilty of possession of marijuana after
the trial court denied the child’s motion to suppress.181 The police officer had
initially observed the child from the officer’s patrol car on a school day at about
8:15am.182 In reversing the denial of the child’s motion to suppress, the
appellate court held that the officer had begun the stop for truancy without
reasonable grounds to believe that the child was absent from school.183
Florida’s status offense statute does not authorize a police officer to
preemptively detain a child who may be plotting to skip school later.184 The
appellate court thus reversed, upholding the motion to suppress.185
Florida’s method for determining whether a juvenile charged with an
act of delinquency should be held in secure detention is determined on the basis
of something known in Florida as the Risk Assessment Instrument (“RAI”).186
In A.M. v. State,187 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking
release from secure detention because his offense was improperly determined to
be a violent third-degree felony.188 The trial court found that a robbery by
sudden snatching of a cell phone qualified as a violent third-degree felony,
which raised A.M.’s RAI to the level of secure detention.189 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s finding and held that the proper
designation of robbery by snatching under the facts of the case was a nonviolent third degree felony, which would have resulted in a lesser RAI
determination.190 In D.L. v. State,191 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on the basis that the court incorrectly scored the RAI by double scoring
possession of a firearm and failing to address whether an unrelated felony
charge was concurrently pending against the child.192 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal reversed, finding as it had in other appeals that it is improper to
include three additional points for possession of a firearm where the possession
is already given the maximum ten points for the third degree felony charge
under Florida law.193
180.
149 So. 3d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 1197–98.
184.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(b) (2014).
185.
J.R., 149 So. 3d at 1198.
186.
FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a).
187.
147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
188.
Id. at 99.
189.
Id. at 99–100.
190.
Id. at 101–02; FLA. STAT. § 812.131.
191.
147 So. 3d 653 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
192.
Id. at 654.
193.
Id. at 655; see also M.W. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 15 So. 3d 782, 783–84
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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OTHER MATTERS

Due Process Shortcomings in the Dependency Court

It is clear beyond peradventure that basic due process rights apply in
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.194 Nonetheless, repeated
failures to comply with the basic due process constitutional protections arise in
the dependency court in Florida and, most recently, cases in Miami demonstrate
this shortcoming.195 First, in R.C. v. Department of Children & Family
Services,196 a termination of parental rights case, a parent sought “certiorari
relief from a sua sponte order of the trial court [obligating the mother] to submit
to a pregnancy test.”197 The appellate court quashed the trial court order due to
the complete failure to accord the mother notice and because there was also no
showing of good cause as applied by law.198 In so doing, after quoting at length
from the trial court proceeding and describing it as being “patently obvious
from the record in this case that the trial [court] acted for reasons of its own
rather than any rule of law,” the appellate court concluded by citing to
Alexander Hamilton.199 “As Alexander Hamilton long ago warned us, ‘it can be
of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature.”200 The appellate court then added “[t]he principle bears an
occasional reiteration, even—and perhaps especially—[with]in our children’s
court. There was no pretense made of following any legislative directives or
intentions in this case.”201
A second Miami case is R.W. v. Department of Children & Families.202
In that case, in a short opinion, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that
the same trial court’s termination of parental rights decision was based upon a
determination that continued involvement of the father in the family relationship
“threaten[ed] the safety or well-being of the child[ren] [regardless] of
194.
FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7,
at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
195.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; A.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147
So. 3d 621, 622–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 150
So. 3d 1277, 1279–80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147
So. 3d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
196.
150 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
197.
Id. at 1277.
198.
Id. at 1279–80.
199.
Id.
200.
R.C., 150 So. 3d at 1280 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 452–53
(Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009)).
201.
Id.
202.
147 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

40

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

services.”203 However, the amended petition did not allege such a statutory
basis but pleaded only abandonment, and thus, the appellate court reversed.204
The third Miami case is A.A. v. Department of Children & Families.205
Here, the appellate court reversed because the mother was denied due process as
a result of the same trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before
denying her motion for modification.206 In that case, there was a combined
failurefirst, to hold an evidentiary hearing and then, to make a written factual
finding addressing the requisite factors enumerated in the statute.207 Those
failures constituted a basic violation of due process rights.208 These cases
follow on the heels of earlier appellate court rulings reversing the same trial
court in Miami for its failure to comply with basic constitutional principles in
G.W. v. Department of Children & Families209 and F.M. v. State Department of
Children & Families.210
B.
The Ongoing Failure to Provide Counsel for Children in Child Welfare
Cases in Florida and Shortcomings in the GAL Program
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida held in In re D.B.211 that children
are not entitled to counsel in termination of parental rights cases.212 Until July
of 2014, the only way that children received counsel in dependency and
termination of parental rights cases in Florida was through volunteer lawyer
appointments or in several counties legal aid representation.213 Thus, while all
parties to these cases were represented by counsel—DCF, the parents, and the
GAL Program—the only unrepresented party was the child unless a volunteer
attorney or legal aid lawyer took the child’s case.214 The GAL Program’s role,

203.
Id. at 632.
204.
Id.
205.
147 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
206.
Id. at 622, 624.
207.
Id. at 623; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2014).
208.
A.A., 147 So. 3d at 622–23.
209.
92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
210.
95 So. 3d 378, 381–82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.W., 92 So. 3d at 309–
10; see also Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013)
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]. The same trial court was reversed in R.L.R. v.
State, a case in which the trial court had held that chapter 39 somehow preempted the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar on the confidentiality of the lawyer child client relationship. 116 So.
3d 570, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
211.
385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
212.
Id. at 91.
213.
Id. at 92.
214.
Id. at 87–88, 92–93.
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as discussed below, is not to represent the child as a lawyer would do but to
represent the child’s best interests.215
During its 2014 session, the Legislature passed a statute authorizing the
expenditure of $5 million to pay for lawyers to act as attorneys ad litem to
represent children before the dependency court in five categories of cases that
are based upon the children’s special needs.216 The serious shortcomings in the
statute are detailed in last year’s survey article, including the ethical issues
relating to the roles of the GAL Program and DCF and their attorneys in
requesting the appointment of and choosing the lawyers for the five categories
of children.217 The problem with the law is exacerbated by the fact that literally
hundreds of other children with serious physical, mental, and educational
problems do not have the right to counsel because they do not fit within the five
categories of the statute as determined by these possibly opposing parties.218
In 2014, the General Counsel for the GAL Program prepared a
document titled Children with Certain Special Needs Attorney Registry that
directly illustrates the underlying problems that arise when applying the 2014
amendment to section 39.01305 of the Florida Statutes.219 First, the document
states that “[t]he appointing court is required to consult with the GAL [Program]
in attempting to locate a pro bono attorney. If a pro bono attorney cannot be
located or a recommendation is not provided with[in] [fifteen] days, the court is
authorized to appoint compensated counsel.”220 A 2011 study demonstrates the
inability of the Florida Bar to provide pro bono lawyers to children in
dependency proceedings,221 thus making it both futile and time consuming to
locate pro bono attorneys and necessitating the use of compensated attorney

215.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Michael J. Dale &
Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child
Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2012) [hereinafter Dale &
Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright].
216.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e); see also Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law,
supra note 7, at 62.
217.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 61–63; see also Dale &
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330; Dale & Reidenberg, The Kids
Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353.
218.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e).
219.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; DENNIS MOORE, GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
CHILDREN WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL NEEDS ATTORNEY REGISTRY (2014), available at
http://www.slideplayer.com/slide/4327595.
220.
MOORE, supra note 219.
221.
See UNIV. OF FLA. & FLORIDA’S CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
DEPENDENT CHILDREN: A 2012 REPORT ON FLORIDA’S PATCHWORK SYSTEM 2–4 (2012),
https://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-clinics/centers/legal-rep-of-dep-children-12.pdf
(demonstrating the Bar’s inability to provide a substantial number of pro bono lawyers for
children in dependency cases).
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representation.222 Second, according to the document prepared by the GAL
General Counsel, it is possible to be registered to represent children for a fee in
dependency cases even if the attorney has never actually handled such a case.223
The attorney merely needs to demonstrate one of the following prerequisites set
out in the document: that the attorney has “observed at least thirty hours of
hearings in dependency cases including at least one shelter hearingone
dependency adjudicatory hearing, one judicial review hearing, one hearing
pursuant to rule 8.350 [of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure] and one
termination of parental rights trial.”224 Contrary to this prerequisite, attorneys
for children “must have the requisite skill and competence to represent children
in [these complex] cases that involve, among other matters,” a variety of federal
statutory rights as well as myriad, medical, psychological, educational,
“cultural, racial, moral, and religious issues.”225
A review of the application of the 2014 amendment to section 39.01305
of the Florida Statutes in its first year demonstrates additional ongoing problems
with the law, leaving aside the issues of the attorney qualifications necessary to
handle these cases and the ethical issues of the GAL Program’s role in choosing
the lawyers for children as a separate party in the proceeding.226 First, during
the first fifteen months of operation, only 1236 children were appointed counsel
with an expenditure of $900,000 out of a budget of $5 million, leaving $4.1
million unspent.227 Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between
volunteer and paid lawyers.228 As explained above, the Florida law requires an
attempt to find volunteers before hiring a lawyer.229 Yet, during the initial
fifteen-month period, more than twenty-eight thousand children were before the
dependency court.230 Second, the appointment of lawyers for children varied
dramatically among the circuits with no correlation to their population.231 In the
222.
See id.
223.
MOORE, supra note 219.
224.
Id.; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350.
225.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 351.
226.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014).
227.
JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.: COUNT BY CIRCUIT AND CASE DESCRIPTION, APPOINTED JULY 1, 2014–SEPTEMBER
21, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on
file with author); JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 2014–
SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62.
228.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
229.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a).
230.
FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:
NOVEMBER 2014 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014].
231.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
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Sixth Circuit—Pasco and Pinellas Counties—with a population of 1.4 million,
there were 254 paid appointments of attorneys ad litem at a cost of $199,000.232
In the Seventeenth Circuit—Broward County—with a population of 1.8
million, there were 37 appointments at a cost of $25,000.233 In the Thirteenth
Circuit—Hillsborough County—with a population of 1.3 million, there were
138 appointments at a cost of $106,000.234 In the Eleventh Circuit—MiamiDade County—with a population of 2.6 million, 130 lawyers were appointed at
a cost of $57,000.235 These statistics do not account for the appointment of pro
bono lawyers who under the 2014 statute are to be assigned first and found by
the GAL Program.236 Nor does it account for the availability of legal aid
lawyers to represent some of these children in some of the circuits.237 However,
the population differences among the circuit courts raises the question of why
the process of paid appointments differs so dramatically from circuit to
circuit.238
The historical role of the GAL Program is also problematic for reasons
unrelated to the 2014 amendment to section 39.010305 of the Florida
Statutes.239 First, data produced during this survey year as well as recent reports
232.

Id.; JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT

TO S. 39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1,

2014–SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES
PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); State & County Quickfacts: Pasco
County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12101.html (last revised
Dec. 2, 2015); State & County Quickfacts: Pinellas County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12103.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015).
233.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
State
&
County
Quickfacts:
Broward
County,
Florida,
CENSUS.GOV,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12011.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015).
234.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
Total Population in Hillsborough County Zip Codes, TAMPA HILLSBOROUGH ECON. DEV. CORP.,
http://www.tampaedc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Hillsborough-County-Population-byZIP-Code.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
235.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
Miami-Dade
County,
SOUTHFLORIDAFINDS.COM,
http://www.southfloridafinds.com/county/miami-dade (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
236.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
237.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232.
238.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232.
239.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for
Children, supra note 7, at 330.
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from the GAL Program demonstrate ongoing serious flaws in the program.240
First, the budget of the GAL Program now exceeds forty-two million dollars not
including federal funds and in-kind services.241 Yet, the GAL Program was
only able to represent approximately 76%242 of the children before the
dependency court in 2014, despite employing more than 145 attorneys,
including an appeals unit.243 It is hard to be certain of the accuracy of these
figures because the Statewide GAL Program—Performance Advocacy
Snapshot—only provides percentages.244 Thus, it would appear that as of June
2015, the court appointed the GAL Program to 84.3% of the children in
dependency proceedings.245 Of the 84.3%, 77.5% had an Active Certified
Volunteer.246 Thus, it would appear that 65.3% of the children before the
dependency court last June had an active certified GAL volunteer.247 One
cannot tell from the GAL website whether the remaining 34.7% of the children
had GAL best interest representation or if they were simply left with nothing.248
A recent announcement from the GAL Program in Palm Beach County seeking
donations stated that it could only represent the best interests of about 800 of
the 1200—66%—children before the dependency court in that Circuit.249 In
240.
See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:
MAY 2015 (June 2015) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2015]; GAL
REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2014 (June 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION
REPORT: MAY 2014]. GAL are the lowest paid state attorneys, and the amount of cases they take
exceeds the American Bar Association’s recommended number, according to a study authorized
and paid for by the GAL Program. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
ATTORNEY COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 3 (June 30, 2014), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/GAL-Attorney-Compensation-Study-Final-Version.pdf. One might
surmise the study was prepared and paid for to a Florida based company for fundraising purposes.
See id. Significantly, the lawyers at the Offices of Regional Counsel, albeit without a study to
support their problems, are also paid at low salaries with caseloads far exceeding professional
norms. See id. at 15–16.
241.
Justice Administrative Commission: Guardian ad Litem Program, FLA. OFF.
PROGRAM
POL’Y
ANALYSIS
&
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1016 (last updated June 11, 2015).
242.
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230.
243.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency
Proceedings, supra note 7, at 330.
244.
Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program — Performance Advocacy SnapShot
(PASS), GUARDIANADLITEM.ORG (June 2015), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/GAL-SnapShot-June-2015.pdf.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
See id.
248.
See id.
249.
Michelle Piasecki, Nonprofit to Help Kids in Need Is Restarted, PALM BEACH
POST, Dec. 4, 2014, at N4.
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Broward County, matters appear to be worse.250 A June 2015 report from the
GAL Program stated that the GAL Program was appointed for 82.23% of the
children before the dependency court, and 56.06% of those children received a
volunteer GAL.251 Thus, less than half of the children in Broward County had a
GAL Program representative.252
Second, the GAL Program seems to be confused about its proper role or
continues to choose to misstate it.253 The GAL Program in Florida is under the
supervision of a state agency in the executive branch that is statutorily
authorized to collect and provide information to the court when appointed by
the court as to what in certain limited situations it believes is in the best interest
of the children.254 It does not represent the child as an attorney does, although
its literature at times says it does.255 GAL volunteers and paid staff may not
practice law, as is the case with any other non-lawyer.256 Thus, they may not
provide legal advice to the child, just as the GAL Program lawyers may not,
leaving no confidential relationship between any GAL representative and the
child.257
Third, GALs cannot provide expert opinions to the court, although as
the case law discussed earlier in this survey demonstrates, they have done so.258
The guidelines for the GAL Program, however, are disingenuous in this
regard.259 They state
“[v]olunteers are not being used as experts in a case and will testify
as lay people, however this does not take away the fact that they may
be credentialed and should be permitted to identify themselves as

250.
251.
252.
253.

See GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2015, supra note 240.
Id.
See id.
See Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at

330.
254.
FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2014); FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IMAGINING THE
FUTURE:
35TH
ANNIVERSARY
1980–2015
7,
15–17
(2015),
http://www.issuu.com/liz338/docs/annual_report-web.
255.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330.
256.
FLA. STAT. § 61.403(7); see also Volunteer FAQ, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD
LITEM PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/faq (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
257.
STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, STANDARDS OF OPERATION 15
(2006), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/StandardsOfOperation.pdf
[hereinafter STANDARDS OF OPERATION]; see also 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM
STANDARDS, supra note 80 at 19.
258.
See A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014).
259.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 9.
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such [and] . . . [t]he court report should not reiterate their credentials
to bolster their credibility.”260

The simple outstanding question—as any lawyer would immediately
recognize—is: What is the relevance of the credential, if not to add to the
credibility of the witness and thus bolster the witness’ testimony?261
Finally, the confusion in the operation of the GAL Program is only
exacerbated by its articulation of the role of its lawyers.262 Despite calls by this
author in this Article and in other articles for the GAL Program to properly state
the role of its lawyers—to represent the GAL Program—it does not do so.263 It
continues to conflate its role with that of the attorney who actually represents
the legal interest of the child.264 For example, the Dependency Practice
Manual, apparently written by GAL Program special counsel, in the
introduction states that “[i]t is hoped that attorneys will use this manual to
ensure that children are the focus of dependency proceedings, that their voices
are heard, and that their legal interests [are] protected through proactive legal
advocacy.”265 That statement defines the role of a child’s lawyer.266 It does not
define the role of a GAL lawyer whose sole ethical obligation is to represent his
or her client, which is the GAL Program.267 To do otherwise would violate the
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility.268 The GAL guidelines as
redrafted this year only makes matters worse. They refer once again to the
“Child’s Best Interest Attorney” and describe the role as “the attorney employed
by the [department] to protect [the] child’s best interest either in the circuit
dependency courts or the appellate courts. There is no attorney-client
relationship between the CBI attorney and the child; however, representing the
best interest of the child is the sole purpose of their advocacy.”269 This
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
See id.
See id., at 7.
See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note

7, at 324.
264.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 7; FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, DEPENDENCY PRACTICE MANUAL 2 (2014),
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/The_Practice_Manual_Final.pdf;
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331.
265.
FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, supra note 257, at 2 (emphasis
added).
266.
See id.
267.
See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7,
at 331–32.
268.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331–
32; see also STANDARDS OF OPERATION, supra note 257, at 6, 20.
269.
2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, at
7.
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statement can only be described as legal nonsense.270 The GAL Program lawyer
represents the GAL Program, a statutory party in a dependency case.271 It is
impossible for a lawyer to represent an idea. The GAL Program literature
describes a form of legal representation that simply does not exist.272
Attempting to apply these GAL guidelines is inconsistent with the law and
defies logic.273
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided two major cases this survey
year.274 First, it set forth the procedure for applying the Supreme Court of the
United States holdings in Graham and Miller that rendered life without parole
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who committed capital and non-capital
offenses.275 Second, it held that Miller should apply retroactively.276
The Florida intermediate appellate courts were active in deciding
delinquency matters primarily involving proper application of restitution
standards.277 The appellate courts were also busy implementing the Horsley
decision, which set out the test for how to determine the proper sentence for a
juvenile previously incarcerated for life without parole.278 In the dependency
and TPR areas, the issue of proper application of the nexus problem was once
again before the appellate courts.279 Another common issue involved the
dependency court rights of immigrant children.280 Also, a pattern of failure to
comply with basic due process rights of parents in child welfare cases appears to
be developing in the juvenile court in Miami as this survey and surveys over the
past two years have illustrated.281

270.
See id.
271.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Dale & Reidenberg,
The Kids Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353.
272.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 6–7.
273.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(b) (2014).
274.
See Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State,
160 So. 3d 393, 408–09 (Fla. 2015).
275.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
276.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d. at 408–09; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
277.
See supra Part IV.
278.
See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408–09; supra Part IV.
279.
See supra Part III.
280.
See In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015); supra Part
II.
281.
See Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62; Dale, 2013
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 210, at 86–87; supra Section V.A.
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Finally, all children in Florida should be entitled to counsel in
dependency and TPR proceedings.282 The 2014 amendment to section 39.01305
of the Florida Statutes, giving some children some lawyers in some cases access
to counsel, is grossly inadequate.283 The GAL Program, with a budget in excess
of forty-two million dollars, consistently and without restraint, mistakes its role
to the detriment of the children.284 The establishment of consistent guidelines
across the board is crucial in providing adequate legal representation that
children not only need, but deserve, in all juvenile proceedings, whether dealing
with delinquency, TPR, or dependency.285

282.
283.
284.
285.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); supra Section V.B.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3); supra Section V.B.
See supra Section V.B.
See supra Parts II–V.
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